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AbstrAct
This paper presents a selection of 43 variables collected from various sources, 
which are used to describe the concepts of decentralization and quality 
of governance in the EU countries. Decentralization is analyzed from two 
aspects, fiscal and political, while the quality of governance is, along with 
certain real indicators, measured in particular with the opinions of citizens. 
The aim of the research was to determine the factor structure of selected 
variables and provide guidelines for using best practices in exploratory factor 
analysis. The exploratory factor analysis classified the selected variables 
into three factors of fiscal decentralization (Fiscal decentralization, Fiscal 
centralization and Government expenditure), three factors of political 
decentralization (Centripetalism, Regional governance, Federalism) and three 
factors of quality of governance (Quality of European institutions, Quality of 
national institutions and Enforcement of EU law). Despite the small population 
observed, the factors showed quite good characteristics and provided a good 
starting point for further research. In this manner, it was shown that despite a 
small population, it is possible to develop factor models of suitable quality by 
using exploratory factor analysis in the sense of best practices.
Key words: fiscal decentralization, political decentralization, quality of governance, 
exploratory factor analysis, EU countries
JEL: C38, H00, H11, H50, H70
1 Introduction
Institutions direct, shape and limit relationships between people, thus 
influencing the political, economic and social outcomes in communities. In the 
traditional sense, the state is an institution with relative sovereignty and own 
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political, legal, administrative and economic system (Aristovnik & Pungartnik, 
2009). With development, the concept of its sovereignty is changing – the 
sovereignty of the state in the traditional sense no longer exists (Cooper, 
2003). In the post-modern global order, in a network of transnational 
institutions, the sovereignty of the state is only “a seat at the table” (Cooper 
2003, p. 44). Because of interdependence, states join integrations, which 
typically have centralized governance, while at the same time, members 
decentralize their governance.
In simplified terms, decentralization means the transfer of competence and 
resources from the centre to the lower levels of governance of a political 
formation (Aristovnik, 2012). Political formations comprising a large area are 
difficult to manage. Power and political influence diminishes from the centre 
towards the periphery, the capacity to implement central politics is limited, 
while the heterogeneity of preferences is greater with larger spatial extent. 
The transfer of competence facilitates the coordination of the formation and 
at the same time addresses the heterogeneity of preferences. In order to 
solve the aforementioned issues, indirect and decentralized governance was 
introduced as early as in the Roman Empire – the so-called ‘divide et impera’ 
system. The level of (de)centralization may be defined as the structure of 
organization of administrative institutions in a given country (or other political 
formation).
The quality of governance is the result of activities of the institutions and is 
conditioned by the structure of their organization. Gerring et al. (2005, p. 
567) cite Montesquieu’s statement that quality governance arises from the 
diffusion of power among multiple independent institutions (the concept of 
decentralization). They control each other’s activities, which ensures a more 
responsible and better operation (Gerring et al., 2005, p. 568). The latter 
statements links the areas discussed in our research: the quality of governance 
and decentralization in the EU countries. 
The substantive objective of the research was to develop factor model, 
making it possible to simplify the data structure of decentralization and the 
quality of governance. From a methodological perspective, the objective 
was to design a methodological framework that enables a more detailed 
treatment of smaller statistical populations.
In the selection of a relevant range of variables defining fiscal and political 
decentralization and quality of governance, a deductive research approach 
was applied, using a combination of data sources and relevant theoretical 
bases. The factor structure of given concepts was determined by means of 
the exploratory factor analysis. In this manner, the starting hypothesis was 
verified:
The application of the relevant range of variables for measuring 
the level of decentralization and quality of governance in the 
EU countries enables the formulation of a factor model of three 
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concepts: fiscal decentralization, political decentralization and 
quality of governance.
For the extraction of factors in the exploratory factor analysis the maximum 
likelihood method was applied, while the factors were rotated by applying 
the direct oblimin rotation, what was done in IBM SPSS Statistics 21 software. 
This article is structured in six chapters. The introduction is followed by the 
theoretical definitions of the areas considered, while the rest of the theoretical 
part of the article presents a review of the methods and approaches (chapter 
3) and the methodology of the second part of the article (chapter 4). The 
empirical study report in chapter 5 comprises the exploratory factor analysis, 
which was applied to obtain the factor model of the phenomenon from a 
range of variables. The results of the research are discussed in the last chapter. 
The limitation of the research is primarily in the size of the statistical 
population, since it is substantially too small for a substantiated statistical 
inference. The selection of variables was based on a relevant study of sources; 
however, no previous models were available, on the basis of which the final 
range of variables could be determined. Considering that the objective of the 
research was exploratory formulation of basic elements for the definition of 
the model serving as the starting point for further research, this limitation 
may be considered as acceptable.
2 Decentralization and Quality of Governance
This chapter presents and substantiates the theoretical bases and range of 
variables, which can be applied to measure the quality of governance and the 
political and fiscal aspects of decentralization.
The World Bank defines the quality of governance as “the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and the 
respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and 
social interactions among them.” (Dijkstra, 2011, p. 1). Quality is defined by the 
expectations of the population of a given country on the outcomes that the 
governing bodies should achieve (Draghici, 2004, p. 2). The quality of governance 
means the capacity of the state to implement its activities efficiently and free 
of corruption (Bäck and Hadenius, 2008). Impartial governance enhances the 
trust of citizens in institutions (Teorell, 2009, p. 21).
Low level of corruption, high bureaucratic efficiency and participation of citizens 
in the operation of democratic institutions are some of the characteristics of 
the quality of governance in a given country (Charron, 2009, p. 9). Corruption is 
the cause and/or effect of the operation of weak national institutions (Judge 
et al., 2011, p. 102). It is commonly the element of estimates of the quality of 
institutional activities.
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The quality of governance arises from the diffusion of power among multiple 
independent institutions – they control each other’s activities, which ensures 
a more responsible and better operation. Hooghe at el. (2009, p. 3) also state 
that structure of government, i.e. the allocation of authority to lower levels, 
determines the outcomes of its operation. One of the proposed solutions of 
the issued of corruption (the variable in the Quality of government group) is 
“to implement inter-regional competition through decentralization” (Fisman 
& Gatti, 2002). Multi-level governance means greater responsibility as a result 
of competition, while the system of ‘checks and balances’ operates on ‘two 
levels’ (horizontally and vertically). On the other hand, Gerring et al. (2005. p. 
567) believe that democratic institutions achieve better outcomes in unitary, 
parliamentary and proportional electoral systems, when the goals of centralized 
authority and broad inclusion are met.
There are certain findings on the positive impact of fiscal decentralization 
(Kyriacou & Roca-Sagales, 2011) and negative impact of political decentralization 
(Gerring et al., 2005; Fan et al., 2009) on the quality of governance in a country. 
Fiscal decentralization has a positive impact on institution; however, this impact 
is mitigated in the presence of multi-level state structures (Kyriacou & Roca-
Sagales, 2011). Liu (2007) identifies a connection between the level of fiscal 
decentralization and good economic and governance performance, while 
Ivanyna and Shah (2011, p. 24) establish a negative effect of the decentralization 
criteria on corruption variables (the Quality of government group of variables 
in our research).
Our research includes the fiscal and political dimensions of decentralization 
on the basis of the typology given by Schneider (2003). The meta-analysis of 
definitions and typologies of decentralization by Dubois and Fattore (2009) 
was used to facilitate the selection of indicators of decentralization. Dubois 
and Fattore point out (2009, p. 706) that contradictory findings and partial 
results on the impact of decentralization on the quality of governance arise 
from incomplete definitions of multi-dimensional variables and the resulting 
methodological limitations of the selected criteria (Ketchen & Shook, 1996; 
Dubois & Fattore, 2009). Liu (Ebel & Yilmaz, 2002) also lists the limitations of 
the application of standard criteria of fiscal decentralization and mentions 
the indicators of the OECD and World Bank as more appropriate, since they 
include qualitative components. Ivanyna and Shah (2011, p. 2) point out 
that it is necessary to include fiscal, administrative and political component 
in the structure of decentralization index. In their research, they use their 
own decentralization indexes, which are unfortunately not published (not 
accessible).
3 A Review of Methods and Approaches
On the basis of the assessment of previous research in the light of the use 
of statistical methods, we note that the most commonly used statistical 
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method in similar research is regression analysis. Gerring et al. (2005) examine 
the impact of centripetalism on certain indicators of good governance by 
means of regression analysis. Their statistically significant results confirm 
the assumption on positive impact of centripetalism on governance. 
Centripetalism is associated with higher bureaucratic quality, higher tax 
revenues, improved investment ratings, greater openness and economic 
prosperity of a country and human development. Depending on the indicator, 
the author uses data collected by La Porta (et al., 1999), Alesina (et al., 2002), 
World Bank (economic indicators, indicators of human development) and 
Marshall and Jaggers (2005).
The regression analysis is used also by Kyriacou and Roca-Sagales (2011) for 
testing the impact of fiscal indicators on (own) good governance index. They 
obtain data on fiscal shares of individual levels of government from the OECD 
data source, and construct the good governance index from four indicators 
of good governance issued by the World Bank (control of corruption, rule of 
law, regulatory quality and government effectiveness). The results confirm 
the assumption on positive impact of fiscal decentralization on the quality 
of governance (due to competition), which, however, may be limited in the 
presence of political decentralization.
By using the regression analysis on a sample of 95 countries, Enikolopov and 
Zuhravskaya (2003, p. 16) determine that the impact of decentralization 
on economic growth, quality of governance and provision of public goods 
depends on political centralization – strength of parties and the manner of 
selection of officials at lower levels of government. They use the following 
data: IMF’s (International Monetary Fund) statistical data for fiscal shares 
by the administrative tiers, data on political institutions provided by Beck 
et al. (2001) for the quality of governance, the Corruption Perception Index 
(Transparency International), individual indicators of good governance issued 
by the World Bank and certain World Development Indicators (the source of 
which is the World Bank).
Ivanyna and Shah (2011) determine the negative impact of fiscal and political 
decentralization on corruption indicators by using the regression analysis. For 
the indicator of fiscal decentralization, they use the data issued by the World 
Bank, which are based on the International Monetary Fund and upgraded in 
the light of estimates of missing values. For the corruption indicator, they use 
various sources – Transparency International (Global corruption barometer), 
World Bank Enterprises Survey and Corruption perception index issued by the 
World Bank.
Altunbas and Thornton (2011) use a sample of 64 countries to confirm the 
assumption on the negative impact of fiscal decentralization on the degree of 
corruption, which can be mitigated by the presence of vertical administrative 
decentralization. As the corruption indicator they use the data from the 
International Country Risk Guide and from the publication by Knack and 
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Keefer (1995), while they obtain the data on fiscal decentralization from the 
publication by Dziobek et al. (2011), which is based on the IMF’s statistics, 
and the data on vertical administrative decentralization from the publications 
issued by the CIA (2009) and Treisman (2000).
Ahrens and Meurers (2002) use the factor analysis to formulate factors 
of governance dimensions (transparency, participation, responsibility, 
predictability) and apply them in a regression analysis, which demonstrates 
the impact of governance on economic reforms and outcomes in countries in 
transition. They confirm an indirect impact of governance on the efficiency of 
reforms, stability of institutional framework, investment rating and economic 
growth.
Dreher et al. (2007) establish a structural model on the basis of which they 
derive the corruption index, which comprises approximately 100 countries in 
the period from 1976 to 1997. They construct a group of potential political 
factors of corruption, which includes democracy, rule of law, political system, 
decentralization, political stability, freedom of the press; a group of social 
factors, which includes religious, language and ethnic fragmentation; and a 
group of economic factors, which includes the share of trade as a percentage 
of GDP, the share of natural resources in exports and the size of the public 
sector.
Suggestions for further research refer to the use of factor analysis and 
method of main components in the selection of variables of the research (Liu, 
2007, p. 103), the inclusion of spatial criteria in the research of institutions 
and economic development (Shepotylo, 2003, p. 132; Arzaghi & Henderson, 
2005, p. 1184; Olsson & Hansson, 2011) the study of determinants of political 
institutions and determinants of fiscal decentralization (Enikolopov & 
Zhuravskaya, 2003, p. 36), the increase in the sample (Liu, 2007) and general 
inclusion of more suitable criteria (Ketchen & Shook, 1996; Dubois & Fattore, 
2009; Ebel & Yilmaz, 2002).
The analysis of countries as statistical units is limited to smaller statistical 
populations; therefore, the power of inference is often weak in this type of 
research. The problem is even more exposed if we want to study only the 
selected subgroup of countries. On the other hand, the rising number of 
different publicly accessible variables measuring the different aspects of 
quality of governance enables the development of new research approaches. 
Many researchers define aggregated indicators by considering only the 
theoretical models. However, contemporary statistical approaches make it 
possible to reduce data dimensionality and also define indicators as statistically 
derived latent variables for statistically disadvantageous proportion between 
the sample size and the number of variables. Our study contributes a case of 
systematic approach to the research of quality of governance based on the 
exploratory factor analysis approach which enables the presentation of the 
characteristics of a group of countries in an intelligible manner.
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4 Methods
As mentioned above, exploratory factor analysis was employed in the research. 
Factor analysis is a multivariate statistical method for data reduction. It is 
used to analyze the correlation in a specific group of variables (Kujundžić & 
Ivanković, 2011, p. 81) and simplify the complexity of connections with common 
dimensions – factors (Bastič, 2006). In principle, there are two types of factor 
analysis – confirmatory and exploratory. Confirmatory factor analysis is used 
for testing hypotheses on the basis of previous (theoretical) assumption on 
dependence between the observed variables and latent concept. Exploratory 
factor analysis is conducted without previous assumptions on the latent 
concept. It is assumed that any variable may be related to any factor. Its main 
goal is to simplify the interdependent variables and identify any possible 
latent concepts (Suhr, 2012, p. 1). The research, the results of which are 
presented here, is of inductive type; therefore, exploratory factor analysis 
was used in the analysis.
The objectives of factors analysis (Rummel, 2011) include: definition of 
structure and relationships, classification and reduction of data, data 
transformation, hypothesis testing etc. Exploratory factor analysis reduces 
the multidimensionality of variables on the basis of common, latent 
characteristics, which are expressed in factors. The main argument for its use 
is in the consideration of latent variables that can have an effect on covariance 
of manifest variables (Costello & Osborne 2005, p. 2). 
The adequacy of variables in the model is compared by means of the 
Cronbach’s coefficient of reliability, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin statistics, where 
high values on the interval [0,1] show the relationship between variables and 
appropriateness of their use in factor analysis, and Bartlett’s test of sphericity, 
which shows the probability of distortion of the data value with the p-value. 
When the statistical significance of the Bartlett’s test is lower than 0.05, the 
null hypothesis that the correlation matrix is equal to the unit matrix may be 
rejected. 
In the analysis of the factor model, the maximum likelihood method was 
used for assessing the model. If data are relatively normally distributed, 
the method is the best choice (Fabrigar et al., 1999). In order to adjust the 
hypothetical data to real data as much as possible, results are rotated. 
Rotation simplifies the factor structure, making its interpretation easier and 
more reliable (Thurstone, 1947; Cattell, 1978). In principle, there are two 
types of rotations – orthogonal and oblique. The main difference between 
them is that the former keeps factors uncorrelated, while the latter allows 
the factor correlation (Rummel, 2011). In our research, the direct oblimin 
oblique rotation was used, which allows the dependence of rotated factors. 
As arguments on the number of factors to be retained – (in)dependent 
samples of relationship between variables, the following was considered:
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• the eigenvalue of the factor is larger than 1 - Guttman-Kaiser criterion 
(Kootstra, 2004, p. 6, Hair et al., 2010, p. 109);
• retained factors account for at least 60 percent of total variance (Hair 
et al., 2010, p. 109); and
• the value of variable pattern loading on the factor is greater than 0.4 
(Fallon and Schofield, 2004, p. 206).
Benčina (2012, p. 8) states that stable factors are constructed from at least 
five highly weighted variables (with weights greater than 0.5), whereby the 
lowest acceptable weight value for the inclusion of variable into the factor is 
0.32.
5 Results
The initial dataset consists of three groups of variables chosen by the 
criteria of relevance and availability, depending on the addressed topics. In 
accordance with the main objective of the study the selection of analyzed 
units was limited to 27 EU member countries
On the basis of the findings of several authors, the basic model of 43 variables 
for the quality of governance and both types of decentralization (Table 1) was 
constructed from three data sources, The QoG Social Policy Dataset, version 
11Nov2010 (Samanni et al., 2010), EUROSTAT (2011) and World Development 
Indicators (Samanni et al., 2010).
The group of variables for the analysis of the quality of governance (Table 1)
includes the variables of trust of citizens in institutions (1–15), the variable 
Functioning of government (16), Index of objective indicators of good 
governance (17) and a set of six variables of ‘Good governance’ issued by the 
Statistical Office of the European Communities EUROSTAT, which are part of 
the European Sustainable Development Strategy (19–24). As the indicator of 
non-quality, the variable of corruption Corruption perception index (18) was 
also included in the group. It is the most commonly used variable of corruption 
and is one of the two variables that provide the best outcomes (Judge et al., 
2011, p. 96–97).
The selection of variables of the second (Fiscal decentralization) and third 
group (Political decentralization) in Table 1 was based on various sources. 
Normally, fiscal variables (variables 25–32) are used as the indicator of fiscal 
decentralization in research, probably due to their availability (most commonly, 
the share of the budget by the ‘administrative tiers of government’ is used) 
(Panizza, 1999; Enikolopov & Zhuravskaya, 2003; Lessmann & Markwardt, 
2010; Kyriacou & Roca-Sagales, 2011; Ivanyna & Shah, 2011). As variables of 
Political decentralization, our research also includes the following: Public 
sector employment (33), Measure of unitarism or federalism (34–41) (Gerring 
et al., 2005), Fractionalization of government parties (42) and Electoral system 
(43) (Enikolopov & Zhuravskaya, 2003).
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Table 1: List of included variables
No. Var. name Variable label Year Source
Quality of government
1 eb_tcj Trust in the European Court of Justice
1996-2004
Sammani et al., 2010
2 eb_tcm Trust in the EU Council of Ministers
3 eb_tec Trust in the European Commission
4 eb_tecb Trust in the European Central Bank
5 eb_teca Trust in the European Court of Auditors
6 eb_teo Trust in the European Ombudsman
7 eb_tep Trust in the European Parliament
8 eb_tsec Trust in the EU Social and Economic Committee
9 eb_tls Trust in the legal system
10 eb_tp Trust in the police
11 eb_ta Trust in the army
12 eb_tpp Trust in political parties
13 eb_tcs Trust in the civil service
14 eb_tng Trust in the national government
15 eb_tnp Trust in national parliament
16 eiu_fog Functioning of Government 2006
17 kk_gg Index of Objective Indicators of Good Governance 2002
18 ti_cpi Corruption Perceptions Index 2000–2007
19 GGI_ic New infringement cases, number 2009
EUROSTAT
tsdgo210
20 GGI_cl Transposition of community law, % 2009 tsdgo220
21 GGI_vt Voter turnout in national and EU parliamentary elections, % 2009 tsdgo310
22 GGI_egov E-government on-line availability, % 2009 tsdgo320
23 GGI_egov1 E-government usage by individuals, % 2009 tsdgo330
24 GGI_cc Level of citizens’ confidence in EU institutions, % 2009 tsdgo510
Fiscal decentralization
25 wdi_tr Tax Revenue (% of GDP) 2011
Sammani et al., 2010
26 wdi_hmtri Highest Marginal Tax Rate, Individual (%) 1999–2006
27 WDI_exps Expense (% GDP) 2011 WDI2001
28 tggex Total general government expenditure (% of GDP) 2009
EUROSTAT
gov_a_main
29 cgex Central government expenditure (% of GDP) 2009 gov_a_main
30 lgex Local government expenditure (% of GDP) 2009 gov_a_main
31 cgttr Central government, total receipts from taxes and social contributions (% of GDP) 2009 gov_a_tax_ag
32 lgttr  Local government Total receipts from taxes and social conributions (% of GDP) 2009 gov_a_tax_ag
Political decentralization
33 pa_emp Public sector employment (as % of total employment) 2009 EUROSTAT gov_dd_edpt1
34 gol_adm Average District Magnitude 1995–2000
Sammani et al., 2010
35 gol_dist Districts, number
36 gtm_centrip Centripetalism 1996–2000
37 gtm_unit Unitarism 1995–2001
38 iaep_ufs Unitary or federal state 1996–2005
39 iaep_arr Appointment of regional representatives 1972–2005
40 no_ufs Unitary or federal state 2002
41 RAI Regional authority index 1950–2006
42 dpi_tf Total fractionalization 1996–2009
43 gol_est Electoral system 1995–2000
The analysis of the meaning of variables indicated that the scales of variables 
from the Quality of government group, measuring the trust of citizens in the 
EU and national institutions, were inverted. Therefore, the values for variables 
1–15 were reversed. The variables included values 1 (tend to trust) and 2 
(tend not to trust), which were converted by the formula 3 – y. In addition, 
inverted orientation was discovered also with the variable gtm_unit (37) from 
66 International Public Administration Review, Vol. XI, No. 3–4/2013
Jože Benčina, Anja Mrđa Kovačič
the group Political decentralization. Since it included values 0, 1 and 2, it was 
converted by the formula 2 – y.
Most of the variables have quite appropriate characteristics:
•	 Relative Standard Error of Mean – seMy / my < 0.10, and
•	 Skewness and Kurtosis < Abs(1).
Some of the variables express a slightly higher relative Standard Error of 
Mean (seMy / my < 0,20), with
•	 Skewness and Kurtosis < Abs(2): kk_gg, GGI_ic, iaep_arr, iaep_ufs, RAI 
and
•	 Skewness and/or Kurtosis < Abs(4): GGI_cc, lgex, gtm_unit.
The relative Standard Error of Mean of the remnant variables is higher than 
0.20 with the highest value at variable gol_adm (0.40; the variable was 
generated from the end model). Three variables (lgttr, gol_dist and no ufs) 
express relative Standard Error of Mean lower than 0.35, with Skewness and 
Kurtosis < Abs(4).
The characteristic of some variables are indeed slightly unpleasant; however, 
the fact is that those are the values of the characteristics of EU countries’ 
policies. For this reason, only the variable with the worst characteristics (gol_
adm) was excluded from further analysis.
The results of the research are factor models of three concepts in 
consideration,	defining	dimensions	of	quality	of	governance,	fiscal	and	political	
decentralization. In this way, an idea about the dimensions of concepts under 
consideration is given.
Characteristics of the models represented by the value of the Cronbach’s 
coefficient	of	reliability	(Cα), as the measure of internal consistency of data, 
Kaiser-Maier-Olkin	measure	of	sampling	adequacy	(KMO)	and	significance	of	
Bartlett’s test of sphericity (pB), are given in Table 2.
Table 2: Characteristics of factor model
Concept Cα KMO pB
Quality of governance 0.435 0.222 0.000
Fiscal decentralization 0.786 0.664 0.000
Political decentralization 0.049 0.464 0.000
Characteristics of the model (Table 2) represented for the concept Quality 
of governance showed lower values of Cα and KMO than requested. 
Nevertheless, the result was a rather good starting point for further 
exploration. The concept Fiscal decentralization showed a suitable consistency 
and adequacy of the model, which indicated a good starting point for factor 
analysis.	Only	the	value	of	the	Cronbach’s	coefficient	of	reliability	for	Political	
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decentralization was low. The value of the KMO test was also slightly lower 
than recommended, while no problems were detected with the significance 
of the Bartlett’s test of sphericity (pB). The analysis showed some weaknesses 
of the models; however, the results indicated that we were on the right track.
In the factor analysis, we took into account the following methods and 
limitations: extraction: maximum likelihood; rotation: Direct Oblimin; 
communalities > 0.400; total variance explained > 0.600; and factor retainment 
criteria: eigenvalue > 1; variable pattern loading > 0.400; and consideration of 
cross loadings.
The first step of the factor analysis of the concept quality of government 
(variables 1 to 24) revealed one variable with lower communality GGI_vt (21) 
(0.315). After eliminating it, we had to determine to extract four factors 
only due to the non-convergence of the model. Next we eliminated the 
variable eb_ta (11) (0.299). Non-convergence of four factors model forced us 
to narrow down the model to three factors. After eliminating the variable 
GGI_cc (24) (0.340), a three factor model with the characteristics (Cα = 0.460; 
KMO = 0.557 and pB < 0.001) was formulated. The extracted three factors of 
Quality of governance account for 77.1% of total variance. The model (Table 
3) expresses quite acceptable characteristics and pattern loadings.
Table 3: Factor structure of the concept of Quality of Government
ID PL Variable Factor TVA
 I Quality of European Institutions 36.5%
1 0.887 eb_tcj
The first factor includes variables of the measure of 
trust in particular European institutions.
2 0.952 eb_tcm
3 0.887 eb_tec
4 0.930 eb_tecb
5 0.893 eb_teca
6 0.719 eb_teo
7 0.876 eb_tep
8 0.899 eb_tsec
 II Quality of National Institutions 32.7%
9 0.846 eb_tls
The second factor consists of variables of the 
measure of trust in national institutions, measure 
of functioning of government, index of objective 
indicators of good governance, corruption perception 
index and e-government development and usage 
indicators.
10 0.790 eb_tp
12 0.908 eb_tpp
13 0.813 eb_tcs
14 0.880 eb_tng
15 0.944 eb_tnp
16 0.806 eiu_fog
17 0.715 kk_gg
18 0.842 ti_cpi
23 0.721 GGI_egov1
 III Enforcement of EU law 7.9%
19 –0.745 GGI_ic The third factor is defined by the number of 
infringements of obligations of EU members and the 
extent of transposition of community law.20 0.718 GGI_cl
Legend: ID – identification number of variable defined in Table 1; PL – pattern loadings of variables; Variable – 
short name of variable; TVA – total variance explained by the factor model.
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The last factor with two variables is relatively weak, therefore, it might be 
reasonable to eliminate it from the model, which would further strengthen 
the characteristics of the model. Since it accounts for the additional aspect of 
quality of institutions, it was retained in the result of this research in order to 
suggest the need to find additional variables that indicate the enforcement 
of (EU and national) law.
The concept of quality of governance is expressed by three latent variables 
(Table 3). The quality of European institutions is measured by the variables 
of trust in EU institutions. The quality of national institutions is measured by 
the variables of trust, which are well-aligned with three indexes of quality of 
governance: Functioning of Government (16), Index of Objective Indicators 
of Good Governance (17), and Corruption Perceptions Index (18). The latent 
variable Enforcement of EU law measures the quality of governance in the 
light of compliance with EU law (19, 20).
Variables from the group Fiscal decentralization (under numbers 25–32, Table 
1) were merged into three factors, accounting for 80.8% of total variance. 
The characteristics of the model were: Cα = 0.786; KMO = 0.664 and 
pB < 0.001. Pattern loadings were acceptable except for the cross-loaded 
variable (PL11 = –0.533, PL3 = 0.589). Further analysis showed that two 
variables (WDI_exps (27) and tggex (28)) should be excluded from the model. 
However, for the sake of expressiveness, in the enter model we retained the 
basic three factor model (Table 4).
Table 4: Factor structure of the concept of Fiscal decentralization
ID PL Variable Factor TVA
 IV Fiscal decentralization 36.0%
30 0.789 lgex The factor comprises local government expenditure, 
total receipts from taxes, and social contributions as 
share of GDP.32 0.934 lgttr
V Fiscal centralization 33.8%
25 0.693 wdi_tr
The factor includes tax revenues, central government 
expenditure, and total receipts form taxes and social 
contributions as share of GDP
29 0.937 cgex
31 1.009 cgttr
VI Government expenditure 11.0%
26 0.628 wdi_hmtri
The factor is built of highest marginal tax rate, and 
expense and total general government expenditure 
as share of GDP. 
27 0.589 WDI_exps
28 0.898 tggex
The model of variables from the group Political decentralization (under 
numbers 33–43 in Table 1) displayed the following characteristics: Cα = 0.046; 
KMO = 0.464 and pB < 0.001. The model was classified into three factors. 
Two variables (pa_emp (33) and gol_est (43) demonstrated extremely low 
communalities in the model, therefore, they were eliminated. This provided 
a model, where all variables exceed the minimal measure of communalities 
with KMO = 0.584. The model (Table 5) accounts for 68.7% of total variance.
1 PL – pattern loading; 1 – factor 1.
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Table 5: Factor structure of the concept of Political decentralization
ID PL Variable Factor TVA
 VII Centripetalism 31.1%
35 1.001 gol_dist
The factor is measured by the number of electoral 
unites, the measures of centripetalism and political 
fractionalization.
36 –0.516 gtm_centrip
42 –0.407 dpi_tf
VIII Regional governance 13.3 %
39 0.990 iaep_arr The manner of appointment of regional representatives.
 IX Federalism 24.3%
37 –0.899 gtm_unit The variables of Federalism which refer to the 
measure of the mode of operation of the state 
(unitary state, two measures of the level between 
unitarism and federalism, and regional authority 
index).
38 0.536 iaep_ufs
40 0.680 no_ufs
41 0.993 RAI
Despite the fact that the model includes an extremely weak factor, determined 
by a single variable, the analysis was finished at this stage. In terms of content, 
it is important to retain a highly informative aspect of regional governance, 
which may be used in future research to further highlight the concept under 
consideration.
The factor analysis provided substantively meaningful results, while the 
structure of concepts is consistent with the expectations. To show the 
usefulness of the factor model we calculated the regression values for nine 
latent variables for EU 27 countries. The rank values are given in Table 6.
Ranking of EU countries by regression values of the quality of national 
governance (II) put Denmark, Luxembourg and Sweden at the top, and 
Lithuania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania at the bottom of the list. The upper 
half of the list is populated more or less with old member countries and the 
lower half with new member countries. Exceptions in the upper part are 
Cyprus and Hungary, while exceptions in the lower part are Italy, France and 
Greece. In relation to the trust in EU institutions (I), the EU countries form three 
groups: the group with high-ranked quality of national institutions and low-
ranked EU institutions with the largest difference for Austria, Sweden and UK, 
the group with similar ranking in both categories with the lowest difference 
for Malta, Greece, Spain and Slovenia, and the group with low-ranked quality 
of national institutions and high-ranked EU institutions with the highest 
difference for Romania, Slovakia, Lithuania and Latvia. The third dimension 
Enforcement of EU law (III) shows no important distinction between old and 
new EU member countries. New member countries presumably have not had 
enough opportunities for infringement yet.
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Table 6: Rank values of EU 27 countries for 9 latent variables of the factor 
model
ID Country
Rankings for 9 latent variables
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
AUT Austria 26 6 15 9 16 8 15 16 5
BEL Belgium 21 14 21 18 9 5 24 13 2
BGR Bulgaria 14 26 6 19 19 27 13 12 25
CYP Cyprus 10 7 20 25 4 16 10 22 23
CZE Check Republic 13 22 16 7 15 23 14 18 15
DEU Germany 22 10 9 11 26 15 4 14 1
DNK Denmark 16 1 7 2 3 2 27 1 12
ESP Spain 17 15 22 13 27 17 16 15 3
EST Estonia 24 16 8 6 14 21 21 8 26
FIN Finland 19 5 12 3 17 4 12 20 16
FRA France 25 19 23 10 21 1 2 6 7
GRC Greece 18 17 26 27 7 3 6 25 8
HUN Hungary 1 12 17 16 8 10 5 21 9
IRL Ireland 3 9 18 24 5 13 20 4 18
ITA Italy 4 20 27 4 13 9 3 17 4
LTU Lithuania 11 27 4 12 23 20 17 5 20
LUX Luxembourg 5 2 19 20 6 18 8 26 21
LVA Latvia 12 23 2 5 25 24 11 23 24
MLT Malta 7 8 1 26 2 22 7 27 22
NLD Netherlands 9 4 11 21 11 6 26 9 6
POL Poland 15 21 24 8 22 19 9 19 11
PRT Portugal 6 13 25 17 10 12 18 11 19
ROU Romania 2 24 14 23 20 26 22 3 14
SVK Slovakia 8 25 5 14 24 25 19 10 17
SVN Slovenia 20 18 10 15 18 14 23 7 27
SWE Sweden 23 3 3 1 12 7 25 2 13
UK United Kingdom 27 11 15 22 1 11 1 24 10
Legend: ID - abbreviations for the names of countries; I – Quality of European Institutions; II - Quality of National 
Institutions; III - Enforcement of EU law; IV - Fiscal decentralization; V - Fiscal centralization; VI - Government 
expenditure; VII – Centripetalism; VIII - Regional governance; IX – Federalism.
Fiscal decentralization consists of three slightly correlated latent variables. 
They are based on the data of the share of government expenditure at 
the central and local government level and data of total government 
expenditure. Ranking list of EU countries, defined by the first dimension 
(Fiscal decentralization – IV), indicates the top ranks for three Nordic 
countries (Sweden, Denmark, Finland), followed by Italy, Latvia and Estonia. 
The lowest degree of fiscal decentralization is observed for Greece, Malta, 
Cyprus, Ireland, Romania, UK and the Netherlands. The result shows that the 
degree of fiscal decentralization is most likely the result of a specific national 
policy. The latent variable of Fiscal centralization (V) was expected to be the 
opposite to the fiscal decentralization. However, the comparison between 
the ranks of EU countries in relation to two variables forms three groups of 
countries:
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•	 higher	 rank	 with	 respect	 to	 decentralization	 and	 lower	 rank	 with	
respect	 to	 centralization	 for	 Latvia,	Germany,	 Spain,	 Finland,	Poland,	
Sweden,	France	and	Lithuania,
•	 similar	ranks	with	respect	to	both	characteristics	for	Bulgaria,	Denmark,	
Slovenia	and	Romania,
•	 lower	 rank	 with	 respect	 to	 decentralization	 and	 higher	 rank	 with	
respect	to	centralization	for	Malta,	Cyprus,	UK,	Greece	and	Ireland.
The	third	dimension	of	the	concept	of	decentralization	 is	the	third	pillar	of	
government	 spending	 (Government	expenditure	 –	VI).	 The	 top	 rankings	of	
government	spending	belong	to	France,	Denmark,	Greece	and	Finland,	while	
the	 bottom	 rankings	 are	 occupied	 by	 Bulgaria,	 Rumania,	 Slovakia,	 Latvia,	
Czech	Republic	and	Malta.	The	results	show	that	EU	countries	follow	different	
policies	 of	 distribution	 of	 budget.	 Since	 Quality	 of	 national	 governance	
indicates	no	correlation	with	Fiscal	decentralization	and	significant	correlation	
with	Fiscal	 centralization	and	Government	expenditure	we	could	 conclude,	
that	 Fiscal	 decentralization	 has	 no	 influence	 on	 quality	 of	 governance	 and	
that	countries	with	more	centralized	fiscal	policy	demonstrate	better	quality	
of	national	institutions.
The	 concept	 of	 political	 decentralism	 consists	 of	 two	 dimensions	
(Centripetalism	(VII)	and	Regional	governance	(VIII))	which	express	the	level	
of	 decentralization	 for	 all	 countries	 under	 consideration,	 while	 the	 third	
dimension	 (Federalism	 IX)	 provides	 reasonable	 information	 only	 for	 larger	
countries.	The	top	rankings	of	centripetalism	are	held	by	UK,	France,	Italy	and	
Germany,	while	the	bottom	is	occupied	by	Denmark,	Nederland,	Sweden	and	
Belgium.	 The	measure	of	 regional	 governance	 is	 the	highest	 for	Denmark,	
Belgium,	Romania	and	 Ireland,	while	 the	 lowest	values	of	 the	measure	are	
recorded	 for	 Malta,	 Luxembourg,	 Greece	 and	 UK.	 Federal	 countries	 are	
Germany,	Belgium,	Spain,	 Italy	and	Austria,	while	non-federal	 countries	are	
Slovenia,	Estonia,	Bulgaria,	Latvia	and	Cyprus.	As	expected,	the	political	picture	
of	EU	countries	is	quite	variegated.	According	to	the	results	of	the	study,	it	
could	be	concluded	that	the	existent	measures	of	political	decentralization	
do	not	enable	the	comparison	of	all	EU	countries,	since	other	characteristics	
of	countries	(size,	tradition	etc.)	have	significant	influence	on	the	value	of	the	
indicators.
In	consideration	of	results	of	the	study	we	present	the	results	of	multivariate	
regression	 analysis	 with	 the	 variable	 Quality	 of	 national	 institutions	
as	 dependent	 variable	 and	 six	 latent	 variables	 of	 fiscal	 and	 Political	
decentralization	 (IV	 –	 Fiscal	 decentralization;	 V	 –	 Fiscal	 centralization;	 VI	 –	
Government	expenditure;	VII	–	Centripetalism;	VIII	–	Regional	governance;	IX	
–	Federalism)	as	independent	variables.
The	graphical	presentation	 in	Figure	1	 is	the	result	of	the	projection	of	the	
multivariate	model	to	three	dimensions.	The	positions	of	countries	in	the	two	
dimensional	 plain	 indicates	 differences/similarities	 amongst	 the	 countries	
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regarding the six independent variables. The value of independent variables 
(Quality of national institutions) is expressed by the size of the bullets (larger 
bullet means better quality). The meanings of the abbreviations of EU 
countries names are given in Table 6.
Figure 1: Projection of the multivariate model
The figure shows that the new EU member countries are in a similar position 
with respect to financial and political decentralization, whereas Romania, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia are far away from the centre with the lowest 
level of quality of institutions (the smallest bullets). At the same time, Hungary 
and Cyprus are placed in the surrounding of old EU member countries with 
significantly higher level of quality of national institutions (the lager bullets). 
It is also evident that countries with the highest quality of national institutions 
are positioned in different regions of the plane. On the basis of this, it may be 
concluded that there are possible different approaches for reaching higher 
quality of national institutions.
The multivariate linear regression model indicates only two significant 
independent variables at the level of 0.1, fiscal centralization (p1 = 0.015) with 
positive influence and centripetalism (p2 = 0.058) with negative influence. 
Huber test of robustness of the model indicates that the model is robust with 
minimal changes in significance of both independent variables (p1 = 0.028; 
p2 = 0.063). Despite the fact that three countries with the best score in fiscal 
decentralization received a high score in the quality of national institutions 
(Sweden, Denmark and Finland), the influence of fiscal decentralization on 
the quality of national institutions is not significant. This is caused by some 
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countries with high fiscal decentralization but relatively low quality of 
governance (Latvia, Czech Republic, Poland and Italy). Therefore, it may be 
concluded that neither financial nor political decentralization can explain 
the quality of institution in EU countries. Both centralized and decentralized 
countries could be found at the top and at the bottom of ranking of the quality 
of national institutions. In looking for better quality of national institutions, EU 
countries could follow different approaches; however, they have to consider 
some quality standard characteristics for successful countries.
6 Conclusions
The main objective of the research plan was to formulate the factor model of 
decentralization and quality of governance and to formulate a framework for 
using best practices in exploratory factor analysis over small samples. A short 
review of the research results is given below.
The developed model represents the logical nature of data. The results 
of the analysis may be used in several ways. The factor model enables the 
construction of the structural model of the impact of decentralization on the 
quality of government. It opens up other possible uses as well, one important 
task in the future will include the consideration of indicators, in particular 
with factors that combine a small number of variables (III – Enforcement of EU 
law, VII – Centripetalism and VIII – Regional governance) and with the model 
of political decentralization as a whole, where the Cronbach’ alpha coefficient 
does not demonstrate a good reliability of the models. The review of variables 
of political decentralization indicates that they are not sufficiently drafted, 
since they do not provide certainty of reliability.
In summary, it may be established that the formulated models of two concepts, 
i.e. the Quality of governance and Fiscal decentralization, are of sufficient 
quality. With the available variables, the quality of the formulated model of 
Political decentralization was insufficient, which was in principle expected, 
since the measurements of political decentralization are rather partial and 
inconsistent and make it difficult to assess the state of the concept (political 
decentralization). However, despite the rather poor result of the consistency 
test, the model is logical in terms of content and can be used as a basis for 
further consideration on the definition of the concept.
The analysis of the regression model indicated different models of governance 
in EU countries, where the level of decentralization cannot explain the level 
of quality of governance. There are other characteristics which influence the 
quality of governance. The presented model exposed that fiscal centralization 
has a significant impact on the quality of institutions. Strong government 
implies good governance. On the other hand, the quality of institutions in 
new EU member countries is lower than in old member countries. The level 
of quality of institutions for Italy, France, Greece and Spain is not significantly 
higher than for new member countries.
74 International Public Administration Review, Vol. XI, No. 3–4/2013
Jože Benčina, Anja Mrđa Kovačič
Studies of dimensionality of the basic concept of decentralization and quality 
of governance are not very common despite the need for comprehensive 
models of concepts in consideration. In this research, the dimensions of the 
three aforementioned concepts for the EU countries were defined. In this 
manner, a logical structure was developed, which can be used for modeling 
the impact of decentralization on the quality of governance in the framework 
of the concepts observed, while the analyzed range of variables can also be 
extended with variables showing the results of the operation of institutions.
The research designed the model of exploratory analysis, which functions 
over a small number of units, following the outlines and recommendation of 
authors concerning the procedure of the assessment of models and selection 
of variables and factors.
The limitation of the research was primarily in the non-availability of studies 
of databases that would provide a consolidated data model at the initial stage 
of the research; therefore, certain areas remained unresolved. Furthermore, 
a tool for factor analysis, called regularized exploratory factor analysis, which 
was introduced recently in the psychometric literature for analysis of small 
samples, was not available for this research (Jung, 2011).
The path for further research is clear. The analysis of the states as units is 
limited by their number, therefore, suitable statistical methods that will 
provide reliable models and results need to be tested and implemented in this 
area. On the other hand, several variables, which are used to asses numerous 
constructs and concepts, are used for the analysis of states. Therefore, it is 
necessary to highlight those indicators and concepts that will meaningfully 
describe the conditions of public governance.
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Povzetek
Faktorski model decentralizacije in 
kakovosti upravljanja v eu
Ključne besede:  fiskalna decentralizacija, politična decentralizacija, kakovost 
upravljanja, preiskovalni faktorski model, države EU
Institucije usmerjajo, krojijo in omejujejo odnose med ljudmi in na ta način 
vplivajo na politične ekonomske in družbe rezultate skupnosti. Politične 
formacije pokrivajo velike površine, zato jih je težko upravljati. Moč in politični 
vpliv se zmanjšujeta od centra proti obrobju. Da bi omenjeno težavo rešili, 
so že v zgodnjih državah  uvedli posredno in decentralizirano vladanje. 
Poenostavljeno povedano pomeni decentralizacija transfer kompetenc in 
virov od centra k nižjim ravnem upravljanja politične formacije (Aristovnik, 
2012). Raven decentralizacije lahko opredelimo kot strukturo organizacije 
vladnih institucij v izbrani državi ali drugi politični formaciji.
Kakovost upravljanja je rezultat aktivnosti institucij. Gerring et al. (2005. p. 567) 
navajajo Montesquieujevo trditev, da kakovost upravljanja izhaja iz razpršene 
moči med številne neodvisne institucije. Te se medsebojno nadzirajo in s tem 
zagotavljajo bolj odgovorno in boljše delovanje. To je tudi izhodišče naše 
raziskave o kakovosti upravljanja in decentralizaciji v državah EU.
Osrednji cilj raziskave je bil razviti faktorski model, ki bo omogočil 
poenostavitev podatkovne strukture kakovosti upravljanja in decentralizacije 
ter prikaz nekaterih značilnosti pojava v populaciji držav EU. Z metodološkega 
vidika pa je bil cilj oblikovati metodološki okvir, ki omogoča kakovostno 
statistično obravnavo manjših statističnih populacij oziroma vzorcev. Zato 
smo v tem smislu oblikovali tudi hipotezo kot trditev, da je faktorski model 
mogoče realizirati.
Raziskovalci posvečajo študiju decentralizacije in kakovosti institucij kar precej 
truda. Svetovna banka definira kakovost upravljanja kot »postopke izbire, 
nadzora in zamenjave vlad; zmožnost vlade da učinkovito oblikuje in uvaja 
dobro premišljene politike in spoštovanje državljanov in razmer za institucije, 
ki obvladujejo ekonomske in družbene interakcije med njimi (Dijkstra, 2011, 
str. 1). Različni avtorji v zvezi s tem izpostavljajo različne vidike, kot so 
pričakovanja populacije države v zvezi z rezultati vladanja (Draghici, 2004, 
str. 2), zmožnost države, da svoje aktivnosti uvaja učinkovito in brez korupcije 
(Bäck & Hadenius, 2008) in zmožnost države, da zagotavljana nepristransko 
delovanje institucij (Teorell, 2009, str. 21).
Ugotovitve raziskovalcev glede vpliva decentralizacije na kakovost institucij 
so različne. Tako lahko zasledimo ugotovitve o pozitivnem vplivu fiskalne 
decentralizacije (Kyriacou & Roca-Sagales, 2011) in negativnem vplivu 
politične decentralizacije (Gerring et al., 2005; Fan et al., 2009) na kakovost 
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institucij v državi. Zanimiva je tudi ugotovitev o slabem vplivu decentralizacije 
na korupcijo (Ivanyna & Shah, 2011, str. 24).
V naši raziskavi smo v model vključili tako fiskalno kot politično decentralizacijo. 
Avtorja Ivanyna in Shah (2011, str. 2) sta razvila indeks decentralizacije, ki bi 
bil morda lahko primeren za primerjanje z rezultati naše raziskave, žal pa ta 
indeks v času izvedbe naše raziskave še ni bil javno dostopen.
Pri raziskovanju tematike se večina avtorjev naslanja na regresijsko analizo, pri 
tem skoraj vedno uporabljajo agregirane kazalnike, ki jih razvijejo na osnovi 
teoretičnih predpostavk. Razvoj latentnih spremenljivk s pomočjo ustreznih 
statističnih metod (faktorska analiza, strukturno modeliranje) je manj pogosta 
praksa, zato nekateri avtorji priporočajo bolj pogosto uporabo tovrstnih 
pristopov (Liu, 2007, str. 103).
Za študijo smo na osnovi priporočil predhodnih raziskav iz nabora številnih 
spremenljivk izbrali 43 spremenljivk, s katerimi lahko opredelimo pojme 
kakovosti upravljanja in fiskalne ter politične decentralizacije (tabela 1). 
Podatke smo obdelali s preiskovalno faktorsko analizo z naslednjima 
nastavitvama: ekstrakcija – maximum likelihood in rotacija – direct oblimin. 
Zanesljivost in ustreznost modela smo preverjali s Cronbach α koeficientom 
in Barttletovim testom sferičnosti. Pri odločitvah o obdržanju spremenljivk v 
modelu in o številu faktorjev smo uporabili standardne vrednosti.
Rezultat študije so trije faktorski modeli s po tremi faktorji. Kakovost 
upravljanja sestavljajo (tabela 3): »kakovost EU institucij« z 8 spremenljivkami, 
»kakovost nacionalnih institucij« z 10 spremenljivkami in »uveljavljanje 
evropske zakonodaje« z 2 spremenljivkama. Fiskalna decentralizacija vsebuje 
tri latentne spremenljivke (tabela 4): »fiskalno decentralizacijo« z dvema 
spremenljivkama, »fiskalno centralizacijo« s tremi spremenljivkami in »vladno 
porabo« s tremi spremenljivkami. Politična decentralizacija obsega (tabela 
5): »cetripetalizem« s tremi spremenljivkami, »regionalno upravljanje« z eno 
samo spremenljivko in »federalizem« s štirimi spremenljivkami.
Študija je pokazala, da bi bilo treba za trden model poiskati dodatne 
spremenljivke, ki bi opisovale fiskalno decentralizacijo in regionalno 
upravljanje. Kljub temu nam model omogoča lep vpogled v rezultate po 
državah (tabela 6), kjer smo države EU rangirali glede na regresijske vrednosti 
faktorjev. »Zaupanje v EU institucije« in »zaupanje v nacionalne institucije« 
sta si bolj ali manj nasprotni spremenljivki, zato prva ni uporabna za analizo 
vpliva decentraliziranosti na kakovost institucij po državah. Spremenljivka 
»uveljavljanje pravnega reda EU« se prav tako nikakor ne vklaplja v razmislek o 
kakovosti nacionalnih institucij, zato smo za predstavitev rezultatov oblikovali 
regresijski model z odzivno spremenljivko »kakovost nacionalnih institucij« in 
s 6 napovednimi spremenljivkami obeh decentralizacij.
Slika 1 prikazuje projekcijo regresijskega modela na dvodimenzionalno 
polje napovednih spremenljivk, pri čemer je vrednost kakovosti nacionalnih 
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institucij predstavljena z velikostjo kroga. Iz slike je razvidno, da 9 novih članic 
nekoliko odstopa od drugih (novih in starih) članic po vrednosti napovednih 
spremenljivk (5 držav na sredini slike zgoraj in 4 države nekoliko pod njimi). Tri 
nove članice so se uvrstile v polje načina delovanja starih članic (Madžarska, 
Ciper in Malta) z večjo kakovostjo nacionalnih institucij od drugih novih članic. 
Sicer pa je iz grafa očitno, da h kakovostnim institucijam vodijo različni pristopi, 
saj najdemo države, ki izkazujejo dobro kakovost na dokaj različnih mestih 
ravnine. Po drugi strani pa imamo na sredini polja več držav z zelo dobro 
kakovostjo nacionalnih institucij (Avstrija, Nizozemska, Finska, Luxemburg), 
in le Dansko ter Švedsko ob desnem robu polju. Če iščemo dobre prakse za 
posnemanje, so to prav gotovo države v sredini polja. Da bi ocenili morebitno 
primernost skandinavskega modela za druge države, pa bi morali realizirati 
bolj poglobljeno študijo problematike.
Sam multivariatni regresijski model je pokazal, da statistično značilno vplivata 
na kakovost nacionalnih institucij le fiskalna centralizacija (pozitivno) in 
centripetalizem (negativno). Rezultat je posledica dejstva, da so med zelo 
decentraliziranimi državami take z dobro kakovostjo nacionalnih institucij 
(Švedska, Danska in Finska) in take z relativno slabo kakovostjo nacionalnih 
institucij (Latvija, Češka, Poljska, Italija).
Z izvedeno študijo smo torej potrdili izvedljivost modela, ki pa je pokazal, 
da so poti do kakovostnih nacionalnih institucij v različnih državah različne. 
S študijo smo prispevali nov vidik obravnave problematike razvoja držav 
EU in pokazali enega od mogočih načinov statistične obravnave problema. 
Prihodnje raziskave bi lahko dopolnjevale nabor spremenljivk, primerjavo 
med indikatorji in upoštevale uporabo nekaterih drugih metod, primernih za 
obravnavo manjših populacij. Vsekakor pa mora biti iskanje dobrih praks, ki 
naj usmerjajo politike držav, usmerjeno v iskanje rezultatov homogenih skupin 
podobnih držav.
